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For an activity that was (or is) so central to the practice of politics in so many countries, electoral 
fraud remains poorly understood. Why and how politicians and parties violated (or violate) laws 
to falsify electoral outcomes constitute a set of topics the importance of which few would deny. 
Understanding how they illegally increased their vote totals or decreased those of their 
adversaries is not only essential to the history of many democratic systems, but an ongoing 
activity in many others. The study of electoral fraud is an ideal way to shed light on whether 
political behavior is shaped more by sociological factors or by institutional arrangements, 
especially where and when survey data is not available.  
 
This study aims to begin filling this void by drawing upon a rich documentary source--the 
petitions to nullify electoral results (demandas de nulidad)--from Costa Rica, a country noted for 
its long history of democratic government. The petitions contain a wealth of material about the 
frequency, nature, and geographical basis of accusations of electoral fraud. They were generally 
lodged by those with legal training and typically published by the daily government gazette (La 
Gaceta). They were one of the weapons most frequently used by the opposition to combat the 
prerogatives largely held by presidents until the mid-twentieth century, namely, the production of 
the electoral registry, the holding of elections, and the tally of the vote. They are valuable 
precisely because of their partisan origins: By virtue of what they say and do not say, they trace 
the frontier delimiting acceptable from unacceptable behavior.  
 
Not surprisingly, some social scientists have been aware of the newspaper or archival evidence 
of electoral fraud. Virtually all of them, however, have shied away from using this information to 
make sense of politicians, parties, and their strategies. Indeed, some claim that electoral fraud 
cannot be studied because, as an illegal activity, its footprints are too faint or jumbled to 
decipher. Yet, as we show, it is possible to extract several quantitative indices from the petitions 
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to get a sense of who was accused of violating electoral laws, as well as how, where, and with 
what success the tampering occurred. Showing how the petitions can be used to shed light on 
political behavior is one of this article's key objectives.  
 
Another important goal is to determine whether this mundane, even "low," form of politics was 
shaped by institutional change. Even if the classification of the petitions to nullify electoral 
results yields systematic patterns, it is not at all clear whether such patterns are a product of legal 
changes wrought by presidents and legislatures in a national capital. They could be the result of 
decisions made by dominant classes to maintain their grip over political systems and thereby 
ensure their economic and social hegemony. Indeed, a bias of much research on Latin American 
history, society, and even politics is that laws and institutions are superfluous to understanding 
the behavior of politicians, parties, and interest groups. This theoretical prejudice is particularly 
evident in research on Central American political systems, which are typically regarded as 
dominated by the military and serving the interests of reactionary landlords and capitalists.  
 
Although there is an element of truth to this portrait, it neglects to mention other relevant facts--
that few Latin American countries completely abandoned republican institutions for long and 
that politicians and parties spent a lot of time and energy in mobilizing voters. To shed light on 
the accuracy of this portrait, we assess the relative roles played by social structure and 
institutional incentives in determining the nature, frequency, and magnitude of electoral fraud. 
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Costa Rica is an ideal place to investigate the impact of electoral reform on political activity. As 
in Chile, Britain, Sweden, and Uruguay, politicians in nineteenth-century Costa Rica gradually 
transformed a competitive but fraud-ridden republic into a modern democracy. Since 1949, the 
country has held regularly scheduled, fair elections, in which every adult is entitled to vote. 
Competitive party politics began in 1889, when the incumbent liberals, under pressure of a 
popular uprising, reluctantly ceded power to an opposition liberal-clerical alliance. After an 
authoritarian regime, under the threat of a hard-line opposition rebellion, made a deal with 
moderate liberals in 1901, politics became competitive, despite the fact that presidents and their 
opponents did not relinquish the use of violence and fraud to distort the results of the ballot box. 
The existence of the 121 petitions submitted to Congress makes a research project like this one 
both relevant and possible. 
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We concentrate on the period between 1901 and 1948 for several reasons. First, during this 
period, competitive elections for the presidency were held, with one notable exception, every 
four years; elections were held every two years to renew half of the members of the legislature. 
Second, legal denunciations of fraud began to appear in the aftermath of the 1893 Law of 
Elections and, in the early twentieth century, quickly became a mainstay of political life and a 
core activity of political parties. Third, several key reforms were negotiated during this time, 
including the elimination of indirect elections for public offices in 1913 and the establishment of 
the secret franchise and other safeguards from 1925 to 1927. This period draws to an end with 
the 1946 Electoral Code, which revamped the electoral registry and made the use of 
photographic identification compulsory for all voters. These reforms provide the benchmarks 
that allow us to determine whether institutional changes altered the nature of political 
competition.  
 
Though we focus on the first fifty years of the twentieth century in a Central American country, 
our concern is not simply to depict politics in Costa Rica more accurately. The systematic study 
of electoral fraud can serve to transform not only our understanding of the democratization of 
Costa Rican politics but also our sense of Latin American politics in general. If the nature and 
rhythm of fraud varies in response to institutional change, then the image of pre-reform politics 
as nothing more than an arena in which the "oligarchy" and other alleged class actors advanced 
their material interests must be discarded. Our study also suggests how the electoral politics of 
the United States and Europe can be examined through a common set of methods to evaluate 
similar hypotheses about the impact of institutional change on political behavior. Electoral fraud, 
after all, does not obey spatial and temporal boundaries: Where laws are lax and democratic 
institutions are new, parties will exploit legal loopholes to gain advantage in the quest for control 
of the state.  
 
Methods for the Study of Electoral Fraud  
After the 1928 presidential elections, the Republican Party (PR) published a manifesto alleging 
that the widespread practice of fraud was responsible for the victory of its rival, the National 
Union Party (PUN), by more than 13,000 votes, or 13 percent of the total number. Even though 
the manifesto makes 169 accusations of fraud, in nearly half of them, it is unclear whether fraud 
really occurred; the PR claimed only that fraud was going to occur. Moreover, even assuming 
that all of these allegations are true, they impugn only the results of 11 percent, or 76 out of 689 
polling stations--only slightly more than half of the 18 percent lead obtained by Cleto González, 
the triumphant candidate. Furthermore, in thirty-six of these polling stations where the number of 
fraudulent votes was calculated, only 12 percent of the votes--574 out of the 4,939 total--at these 
stations, were actually charged with being fraudulent. 
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This example illustrates the central problem in the study of electoral fraud. It was common for 
parties to claim that they had been robbed of an electoral victory by the malfeasance of their 
adversaries. In an environment where parties tried to stuff the ballot box, such accusations 
allowed parties to rationalize their defeats and to deprive the winners of political legitimacy. 
Such charges were often the first step toward an attack on the government, either from Congress 
and/or from the press; not infrequently, they were part of an effort to justify an armed revolt 
against central state authorities. One of the problems plaguing newspaper reports of ballot 
rigging is that they tend to exaggerate it, especially since newspapers and publications like the 
PR's manifesto were linked to parties and highly interested in the outcome of electoral contests. 
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The partisan nature of denunciations of fraud is just one reason, however, why scholars have 
generally shied away from the study of electoral fraud. Although a few historians and political 
scientists have held that the number, the complexity, and the credibility of such accounts make it 
impossible to quantify the impact of fraud on electoral results, the consensus among students of 
pre-reform political systems is simply that the topic is too difficult to study. The best books 
about such systems tend to refer elliptically to fraud, even if it emerges as crucial to the mixture 
of campaigning, competition, and threat making that characterized "elections before (full) 
democracy." 
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Despite the difficulties, however, some analysts have succeeded in making sense of electoral 
fraud. In perhaps the most systematic study to date, Cox and Kousser analyzed more than 300 
newspaper reports of rural electoral corruption in New York during the last decades of the 
nineteenth century. Even though they do not determine the precise effect of this fraud on vote 
totals, their effort is noteworthy because they show, through straightforward quantification, that, 
with the establishment of the secret franchise in 1890 in New York, parties both bought votes 
and paid voters to stay home. In perhaps the most detailed examination of any pre-reform 
electoral system, O'Gorman briefly considered the impact of fraud on British elections in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, showing that the number of complaints about election 
results sent to the House of Commons declined during this period, mostly because of the high 
costs of documenting accusations and getting them to Parliament before the Commons convened. 
Although Mayfield did not specifically analyze acts of fraud, he shed light on the issue by 
examining voter turnout rates in turn of the century Pittsburgh. He argued that the electoral rolls 
could not have been padded because turnout increased after the establishment of a personal 
registration system in 1906. If the voter registry had been padded, absolute turnout rates would 
have declined in the aftermath of a Progressive-era institutional reform. 
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These studies, however, are the exceptions. In a wide-ranging review of the subject of fraud, 
Argersinger suggested that students of United States elections have barely begun to tap into the 
wealth of personal testimonies and judicial, congressional, and executive records that exist on 
electoral fraud. The same is true about documentation of their counterparts elsewhere. Although 
Latin America has a long, rich history of elections, with a massive number of legal complaints 
and many journalistic accounts of electoral fraud, it has not been the target of such studies. 
Notwithstanding a few exceptions, even Europeanists have ignored a key source of information 
vital for linking institutional reform with political behavior, "high" politics with "low" politics, 
and legal methods with illegal ones in the formation of republican and democratic forms of 
government. 
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This point assumes that there is a consensus about what constitutes fraudulent activity. A legal 
definition could refer to acts that violate existing laws governing how voter registries are set up, 
how citizens identify their preferences, and, most important, how votes are tallied. Since 
standards change over time, this ostensibly narrow view possesses the advantage of revealing 
how legal definitions of fraud might change according to the compromises reached by parties 
struggling to determine what are and are not acceptable forms of electoral behavior.  
 
A broader definition could describe fraud as any practice that interferes with the choices made by 
voters. Although based on an understanding of how social, political, or economic inequality can 
affect the choices made by citizens, it permits dangerous presumptions about the preferences of 
voters. Theoretically, it could serve to justify an attempt to turn legitimate electoral practices into 
violations of electoral law. Hence, we opt for the narrow definition, preferring to track violations 
of electoral law by political practice, without, however, neglecting to explore how changing 
conceptions of electoral fraud might view the same sort of practice in divergent ways.  
 
Petitions to nullify electoral results and related legal documents are ideal vehicles for exploring 
these themes. They contain a wealth of documentary evidence typically missing in newspaper 
accounts, and they tend to be highly technical because litigants had to prove that specified 
sections of the law had been violated. As article 103 of the 1893 Law of Elections reads, 
"Citizens have the right to present accusations to nullify electoral results; but, they must describe 
the events which occurred and to present evidence. In the absence of such requisites, the 
denunciation will not be accepted." 
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These procedures were only slightly amended by the 1908 and 1909 reforms, which empowered 
plaintiffs to appeal the verdicts made by provincial electoral councils about popular elections to 
the Chamber of Repeal (Casación) of the Supreme Court. This measure was dropped by the Law 
of Elections in 1913, the same year when a constitutional reform to establish direct elections 
obtained final approval. Henceforth, all petitions to nullify presidential and congressional 
elections were to be considered exclusively by Congress, as stipulated by the 1871 constitution. 
Despite its length, it is worth citing article 72 of the 1913 Law:  
 
Every citizen has the right to denounce or identify cases for nullification. . . . The petition should 
be written and addressed to the body that must consider it, but it will not be judged unless it is 
presented within 10 working days after election day or the act constituting grounds for 
nullification. Furthermore, to admit the petition or accusation, the events, circumstances or 
conditions should be identified that impugned the legality of the act, vote, resolution, vote total 
or election. Admission also requires the infringed laws to be cited and the grounds for 
nullification are identified upon which the accusation is based. It also requires that each charge 
be accompanied by documentary evidence that is adduced to justify it or to present the reasons 
that make it comprehensible to excuse the omission of such evidence. 
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The 1913 Law also required that the petitions be published in the daily government gazette so 
that citizens could become informed of the accusations and, if relevant, present timely arguments 
against or in favor of such claims. The electoral laws of 1925 and 1927, which regulated the 
elections between 1926 and 1946, essentially maintained the provisions of the 1913 law.  
 
Another difference between petitions and newspaper reports is that the former comprised the first 
stage of a legal and political process that could alter electoral outcomes. This feature not only 
explains their legal-technical nature, but also suggests that the right to petition authorities 
fomented the institutionalization of parties by rewarding those that could field a network of 
observers, scribes, and lawyers. In the months or weeks before elections, party representatives 
supervised the revision of the public lists of voters in every district to ensure that supporters who 
had come of age or were new residents of the district were included. They worked to ensure that 
the names of voters who were deceased, relocated, or fictive were excluded from the electoral 
rolls. They also inspected polling stations to ensure that they were appropriate places for holding 
elections. On election day, party observers (fiscales)--among whose ranks could be found 
farmers and artisans--were present at polling stations to document irregularities and inform the 
party leadership and local authorities. On occasion, they even sent telegrams to the president of 
the republic.  
 
After the elections, parties entrusted one of their members, typically a lawyer, to draft petitions 
based on the reports of the observers for presentation to one of several bodies. Sometimes party 
observers themselves would petition relevant authorities, especially during midterm elections for 
Congress. The local party leadership played a particularly important role in writing petitions 
because of the larger than usual number of provincial parties competing for office during 
midterm elections. Once petitions were presented to Congress, they were examined by the 
Credentials and Resignations Committee, which typically consisted of three deputies elected at 
the end of the ordinary sessions of Congress immediately prior to an election year. Then 
Congress as a whole voted on whether to endorse them, a task of even more political significance 
when the Committee issued both majority and minority views. 
 
One last series of documents is useful for the study of electoral fraud, the tally of the vote 
conducted by provincial electoral councils. In the course of such deliberations, both party 
observers and council officials often denounced and recorded infractions committed during the 
tallies. This data complements the information furnished by the petitions to nullify electoral 
results. 
 
Although the petitions usefully describe the efforts of parties to manufacture fraud, they are also 
crucial components of competitive party politics. They not only tell us about the actual 
frequency, nature, and geographical extent of fraud, but also about the ways that parties jockeyed 
for position in an arena where losing or winning votes translated into the loss or conquest of state 
power. Of the twenty elections that took place between 1901 and 1946, for example, exactly half 
involved accusations against two or more parties. In seventeen elections, complaints were filed 
against the party whose leader was the president. These numbers indicate that incumbents were 
not the only parties capable, and suspected, of resorting to fraud. Despite the disadvantages of 
not controlling the presidency, opposition parties also illegally sought to subvert election results. 
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The Periodization and Production of Petitions  
Throughout the period from 1901-1948, 167 individuals presented 121 petitions. The difference 
between the number of sponsors and petitions stems from the fact that 17 of the 121 petitions 
were presented by two or more persons and that 17 individuals presented two or more petitions. 
The multiple authorship sometimes had a symbolic component, especially when signatories were 
important national figures, as it did for the 13 individuals who presented a petition in the 
aftermath of the hotly contested 1944 election, lost by León Cortés (1936-1940), a former 
president. These results are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Petitions and Related Legal Material, by Time Periods, 1901-1948  
       Number of  
 
Type 
1901- 
1912 
1913- 
1923 
1925- 
1938 
1940- 
1948 Total 
Time 
Period Petitions Plaintiffs 
 
Petitions 4 35 40 15 94 1901-12 22 51 
Complaints (Reclamos) 13 -- -- -- 13 1913-23 44 59 
Protests 4 9 -- -- 13 1925-38 40 33 
Reports (Memoria les) 1 -- -- -- 1 1940-48 15 24 
Total 22 44 40 15 121 Total 121 167 
 
Source: La Gaceta (1901-1948). 
 
The fact that some presented more than one petition makes it clear that individuals in parties 
were gaining the experience and acquiring the knowledge of writing petitions. Of the seventeen 
individuals who presented two or more petitions between 1901 and 1948, two had been, or 
became, electors and eight had been, or became, deputies. Eight were lawyers, and two 
subsequently joined the legal profession.  
 
Table 2 reveals that many petitioners had legal training and held elected office. Of the 167 
individuals that presented the petitions between 1901 and 1948, 28 percent were members of the 
legal profession, either as real or alleged lawyers or law students. Furthermore, 13 percent had 
been, were, or subsequently became electors, and 34 percent had been, were, or subsequently 
became deputies. Since the occupational or professional status of 52 percent of the individuals 
presenting petitions is unavailable, the percentage of legal specialists among the petitioners could 
be higher than 28 percent. All of the petitioners were active in politics.  
 
Table 2 
Occupational Status and Political Experience of Petitioners, 1901-1948  
Occupation 
/Profession 
1901- 
1912 
1913- 
1923 
1925- 
1938 
1940- 
1948 Total 
Legislative 
Deputies 
Second-
Stage 
Electors 
 
Law 8 15 10 13 46 24 1 
Agriculture 2 8 -- -- 10 2 3 
Commerce 2 4 2 -- 8 1 2 
Medicine -- 2 4 2 8 5 1 
Industry 1 3 1 -- 5 1 1 
Education -- 1 1 1 3 2 -- 
Other -- -- -- 1 1 -- -- 
Unknown 38 26 15 7 86 22 14 
Total 51 59 33 24 167 57 22 
 
Source: La Gaceta (1901-1948). 
 
Table 1 also presents information about allegations of electoral fraud by time periods, each of 
which is delimited by a major institutional or political transformation. During the first period, 
1901 through 1912, voting took place in two stages, and parties submitted formal accusations of 
fraud in the form of complaints (reclamos), reports (memorias), and protests. Voting in the 
popular elections held every four years was public, but the electors chosen to meet in provincial 
electoral assemblies to select presidents and deputies cast their ballots in secret. During this 
period, suffrage rights--as commentators of the time liked to emphasize, and calculations of the 
voting age population from census records confirm--were universal for all males at least twenty-
one years old. Though the 1871 constitution required citizens to possess property to be registered 
to vote, the vagueness of this restriction in an atmosphere of highly contested elections 
encouraged political authorities and parties to endow voting rights on virtually all adult males. 
Electors were required to have a specified amount of income and to be literate. 
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During the second period, between 1913 and 1924, voting remained public, but citizens directly 
chose their representatives. The third period, which runs between 1925 and 1938, begins with the 
establishment of the secret franchise. Though the 1925 electoral law eliminated public balloting, 
the presence of party observers at polling stations allowed parties to furnish ballots to voters and 
robbed the secret franchise of much of its force. Only after the 1927 law, which bestowed the 
production of paper ballots on the secretary of the interior (Gobernación), did citizens possess 
the safeguards necessary to vote as they pleased. During the last period, 1940 through 1948, the 
law guiding electoral practice remained largely unchanged, but the increasing polarization of 
political competition relocated the geographical distribution of accusations of electoral fraud 
from the periphery to the center.  
 
The Geography of Electoral Fraud  
Table 3 reveals that the chronological distribution of petitions was uneven. Because a petition 
was mainly a platform for multiple accusations against one or several polling stations, we 
identify the number of requests for nullification contained in the petitions. The 120 petitions 
issued between 1901 and 1946 contain a remarkable 1,100 accusations. Another 139 accusations 
were formulated during the tally of the vote conducted by provincial electoral juntas. We place 
each accusation in one of seven provinces, each of which we classify as being central or 
peripheral (see Figure 1). 
 
Table 3 
Average Number of Legal Denunciations and Accusations of Fraud, by Election and Time 
Period, 1901-1948  
   By Election  
 
Time Period 
Number of 
General 
Elections 
Midterm 
Legislative 
Elections 
Average 
Number of 
Legal 
Denunciations 
Average 
Number of 
Accusations 
 
1901-1912
a
 6 3 2.4 15.8 
1913-1923 4 2 7.3 73.7 
1925-1938 3 4 4.7 52  
1940-1948 3 2 4.8 58.2 
Total 16 11 4.5 45.9 
 
a
 Between 1901-1912 three popular elections and six second-stage elections were 
held. First-stage elections were held every four years and the electors remained in 
their posts for four years. Only electors chose representatives in provincial 
electoral assembles during this period. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Costa Rica  
 
Then, as now, the four central provinces are Alajuela, Cartago, Heredia, and San José. 
Encompassed in a region known as the Central Valley, approximately 3,200 square km, this area 
held many of the country's small- and medium-sized producers of coffee, one of the Republic's 
principal exports. The mestizo population of the Central Valley was the principal beneficiary of 
the public health and educational reforms launched by liberals in the late nineteenth century. By 
1927, for example, 69 percent of the population nine years of age or older was literate. In 1901, 
these provinces housed 80 percent of the electorate; by 1946, they contained 74 percent of the 
registered voters. 
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In contrast to the center, the province of Guanacaste was populated by an impoverished 
peasantry and dominated by large-scale cattle ranchers and foreign mineral corporations. In the 
Atlantic coast province of Limón, agricultural workers labored, until the 1930s, on estates owned 
by the United Fruit Company. Whereas Guanacaste consisted of a mulatto and mestizo 
population, Limón held large numbers of English-speaking immigrants from the West Indies and 
a significant number of Nicaraguans. When United Fruit left Limón in the 1930s, the company 
settled in the Pacific Coast Province of Puntarenas, which was populated by a mestizo population 
of poor peasants and agricultural workers. 
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In the peripheral and largely rural provinces, where the small number of indigenous peoples 
predominantly lived, education and public health services were less abundant. The 1927 census 
suggests that the literacy rate in Guanacaste and Puntarenas was 57 and 50 percent, respectively. 
In Limón, the literacy rate reached a high of 77 percent, in large part because many West Indians 
could read and write English. In 1901, only 20 percent of the electorate resided in the periphery; 
by 1946, this total increased slightly to 26 percent. Even though the departure of United Fruit 
encouraged out-migration, it was more than compensated by peasant agricultural colonization 
from the Central Valley.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Accusations Against Elections (ae) and Impugned Polling Stations (ips), by Regions 
and Time Periods, 1901-1946. SOURCE: La Gaceta (1901-1946).  
 
Differences in social structure expressed themselves politically. According to Figure 2, the 
periphery, despite possessing the smallest share of the electorate, generated 50 percent of the 
accusations of electoral fraud between 1901 and 1912, 57 percent between 1913 and 1923, and 
58 percent between 1925 and 1938. Figure 1 also identifies the locations of the polling stations 
assailed by party observers. It reveals that 45 percent of the polling stations called into question 
were located in the periphery between 1901 and 1912, 43 percent between 1913 and 1923, and 
50 percent between 1925 and 1938. That the proportion of accusations typically surpasses the 
proportion of polling stations in the periphery where results were impugned indicates that 
electoral competition was intense and geographically concentrated.  
 
With the exception of the 1940s, denunciations of fraud were concentrated in the poorest and 
least populated parts of the country. This trend is consistent with other research, which reveals 
that social conflicts were less intense and violent in the Central Valley than in the periphery. The 
findings reveal the existence of two different societies in Costa Rica. In addition to housing the 
most important urban centers, the center held significant numbers of small- and medium-sized 
coffee growers. Though the number of rural wage laborers increased throughout this period, 
many continued to have access to land. 
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In contrast, social differentiation was much more pronounced in the periphery, where the 
laborers who worked the large cattle or banana estates were often completely landless. 
Possessing few economic resources and inhabiting an environment where acts of coercion were 
more commonplace, citizens in the periphery confronted parties, politicians, and electoral 
officials who were more apt to bend the law or commit outright acts of fraud to distort the will of 
the local, largely rural and illiterate, electorates. Unlike their counterparts in the center, citizens 
and parties of the periphery were not so able to defend themselves against the encroachments of 
electoral law perpetrated by their rivals.  
 
Yet, it would be misleading to argue that social structure single-handedly determines the nature 
and spatial distribution of electoral fraud. As Figure 1 shows, parties reversed their traditional 
patterns by the 1940s. The percentage of accusations about fraud directed at events and 
circumstances in the center went from less than 50 percent to 67 percent between 1940 and 1946; 
the percentage of polling stations impugned in the center rose from less than 50 percent to 67 
percent. Containing 74 percent of the registered electorate by 1946, the center, for the first time, 
began to experience its share of electoral fraud.  
 
The unusually rapid increase in the frequency and intensity of fraudulent activity in the center 
during the 1940s was fuelled by a crisis concerning political succession. The 1927 electoral law's 
concentration of disciplinary authority over electoral matters, along with the responsibility for 
safeguarding the electoral registry, in the hands of the presidency produced a set of incentives 
too tempting for President Rafael Angel Calderón (1940-1944) of the National Republican Party 
(PRN) to ignore. Once the regime's popularity began to wane, the PRN employed the powers of 
the executive branch to prevent the opposition from increasing its Congressional representation 
and from electing its candidate to the presidency. Even though analysis of electoral results 
indicates that fraud was not solely responsible for Teodoro Picado's victory in 1944, the apparent 
scale of fraudulent activity scandalized many and stimulated the development of hardline sectors 
dedicated to overthrowing PRN governments through the use of force. 
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The dramatic geographical shift in the concentration of fraud helps to explain why ballot rigging, 
which had always been so common in Costa Rican politics, became a rallying cry for the 
opposition during the 1940s. Once acts of political arbitrariness spread to the center, where most 
literate and sophisticated voters lived, it became a highly contentious issue, potent enough to 
create what became the central cleavage of Costa Rican politics. Although rural social structure 
explains the spatial distribution of allegations of fraud until the 1940s, the spread of practices 
from the periphery to the center is an argument against a sociological determinism to the effect 
that social structure and the ensuing nature of civil society unilaterally shape the rhythm and 
nature of electoral fraud. The very struggle for power, as shaped by institutional arrangements, 
can foment the behavior associated more with political polarization than with political 
moderation.  
 
The Nature of Electoral Fraud  
Tables 4 and 5 present several qualitative measure of fraud. With the exception of the first 
period, most accusations of fraud were directed against polling stations, suggesting that a 
majority of irregularities were attributed to electoral authorities. Agents external to political 
competition, whether other state officials, landlords, or employers pressuring citizens to vote for 
their candidates, were not the principal targets of petitioners. Significantly fewer charges claim 
that voters were coerced into voting for a particular party or that polling stations were physically 
threatened. Such complaints increased from roughly 12 percent of all accusations between 1913 
and 1923 to approximately 16 percent during the polarized atmosphere of the 1940s. Patróns 
(landlords), gamonales (local machine bosses), and other individuals with private interests rarely 
became the objects of direct, or indirect, attack in the petitions. Most of the charges of coercion 
were lodged against public authorities without any mention of private interests.  
 
Table 4 
Accusations of Electoral Fraud, by Type and Time Period, 1901-1946 (in Percentages and 
Numbers)  
 Time Periods  
 
 
Accusation 1901- 1913- 1925- 1940- Total 
1912 1923 1938 1946 
 
Second-stage elector 
excluded 
2.8%  
(4) 
-- -- -- 0.3%  
(4) 
Second-stage elector 
not qualified to vote 
7.8% 
(11) 
-- -- -- 11.9% 
(11) 
Formal requirements 
for second-stage 
election violated 
5.6% 
(8) 
-- -- -- 0.6% 
(8) 
Second-state elections 
held outside of official 
time period 
0.7% 
(1) 
-- -- -- 0.1% 
(1) 
Authorities did not take 
an electoral census 
0.7% 
(1) 
0.2% 
(1) 
-- -- 0.2% 
(2) 
Official coercion of 
second-stage electors 
0.7% 
(1) 
-- -- -- 0.1% 
(1) 
Official coercion of 
voters 
0.7%  
(1) 
10.9%  
(48) 
5.5% 
(20) 
11.3% 
(33) 
8.2% 
(102) 
Official coercion of 
polling station 
3.5% 
(5) 
0.9% 
(4) 
0.8% 
(3) 
4.8% 
(14) 
2.1% 
(26) 
Nonofficial coercion of 
voters 
-- 0.2% 
(1) 
0.8% 
(3) 
-- 0.3% 
(4) 
Official intimidation of 
voters 
-- 0.3% 
(3) 
1.4% 
(5) 
2.8% 
(8) 
1.3% 
(16) 
Nonofficial 
intimidation of voters 
-- -- 0.3% 
(1) 
3.4% 
(10) 
0.9% 
(11) 
Officials' favoritism 
toward a party 
45.1% 
(64) 
3.9% 
(17) 
5% 
(18) 
3.1% 
(9) 
8.7% 
(108) 
Elected official not 
qualified for post 
2.1% 
(3) 
1.4% 
(6) 
1.6% 
(6) 
-- 1.2% 
(15) 
Purchase of votes -- 2.3% 
(10) 
13.7% 
(50) 
-- 4.8% 
(60) 
Liquor distributed on 
election day 
-- 1.1% 
(5) 
2.5% 
(9) 
2.4% 
(7) 
1.7% 
(21) 
Accusations against 
polling stations 
30.3% 
(43) 
73.5% 
(325) 
65.1% 
(237) 
68.7% 
(200) 
65% 
(805) 
Unknown -- 2.9% 
(13) 
-- -- 1.1% 
(13) 
Other -- 2% 
(9) 
3.3% 
(12) 
3.5% 
(10) 
2.5% 
(31) 
Total 100% 
(142) 
100% 
(442) 
100% 
(364) 
100% 
(291) 
100%  
(1,239) 
 
Source: La Gaceta (1901-1946). 
 
Table 5 
Accusations of Fraud against Polling Stations, by Type and Time Period, 1901-1946 (in 
Percentages and Numbers)  
 Time Period  
 
 
Accusation 1901- 
1912 
1913- 
1923 
1925- 
1938 
1940- 
1946 
Total 
 
Inappropriate exclusion 
of voters 
11.6% 
(5) 
3.7% 
(12) 
-- -- 2.1% 
(17) 
Party observer expelled 
or threatened 
4.7% 
(2) 
8.9% 
(29) 
10.6% 
(25) 
12.5% 
(25) 
10.1% 
(81) 
Absence of formal 
requisites 
48.8% 
(21) 
56.9% 
(185) 
35% 
(83) 
10.5% 
(21) 
38.5% 
(310) 
Voter cast more than 
one ballot 
2.3% 
(1) 
3.1% 
(10) 
5.9% 
(14) 
3% 
(6) 
3.9% 
(31) 
Placement of voting 
booth in an 
inappropriate place 
2.3% 
(1) 
3.1% 
(10) 
3.4% 
(8) 
1% 
(2) 
2.6% 
(21) 
Elections held outside 
of official time period 
4.7% 
(2) 
2.8% 
(9) 
2.1% 
(5) 
9.5% 
(19) 
4.3% 
(35) 
Voters did not meet 
requirements (too 
young not citizens etc.) 
26% 
(11) 
12.3% 
(40) 
0.8% 
(2) 
-- 6.6% 
(53) 
Voters prevented from 
casting ballots 
-- 1.2% 
(4) 
-- -- 0.5% 
(4) 
Number of votes 
inflated 
-- 2.5% 
(8) 
7.2% 
(17) 
10% 
(20) 
5.6% 
(45) 
Number of votes 
exceeding number of 
voters 
-- 0.6% 
(2) 
-- -- 0.2% 
(2) 
Elections not held -- 0.9% 
(3) 
0.8% 
(2) 
1% 
(2) 
0.9% 
(7) 
Votes not received -- 0.6% 
(2) 
0.4% 
(1) 
-- 0.4% 
(3) 
Substitution of votes 
permitted 
-- 3.1% 
(10) 
9.3% 
(22) 
18.5% 
(37) 
8.6% 
(69) 
Location of polling 
stations changed on 
election day 
-- 0.3% 
(1) 
-- -- 0.1% 
(1) 
Voters intimidated -- -- 0.4% 
(1) 
-- 0.1% 
(1) 
Ballots altered -- -- 3.4% 
(8) 
-- 1% 
(8) 
Votes annulled -- -- 1.7% 
(4) 
4.5% 
(9) 
1.6% 
(13) 
Number of ballots 
exceeding number of 
voters 
-- -- 3.8% 
(9) 
7% 
(14) 
2.9% 
(23) 
Electoral identification 
rejected 
-- -- 3.4% 
(8) 
-- 1% 
(8) 
Electoral identification 
not demanded of a 
citizen 
-- -- 0.4% 
(1) 
-- 0.1% 
(1) 
Number of ballots not 
equal to number of 
identification cards 
-- -- 0.8% 
(2) 
-- 0.2% 
(2) 
Ballots substituted -- -- 0.4% 
(1) 
2% 
(4) 
0.6% 
(5) 
Electoral identification 
removed 
-- -- 2.1% 
(5) 
3.5% 
(7) 
1.5% 
(12) 
Ballots removed -- -- 0.4% 
(1) 
1% 
(2) 
0.4% 
(3) 
Ballot box altered -- -- 1.3% 
(3) 
5% 
(10) 
1.6% 
(13) 
Voting was public -- -- 6.4% 
(15) 
6% 
(12) 
3.4% 
(27) 
Vote tally conducted by 
unauthorized 
individuals 
-- -- -- 2% 
(4) 
0.5% 
(4) 
Electoral 
documentation not 
-- -- -- 1.5% 
(3) 
0.4% 
(3) 
surrendered for 
legislative elections 
Electoral 
documentation opened 
before election day 
-- -- -- 0.5% 
(1) 
0.1% 
(1) 
Electoral 
documentation 
collected by 
unauthorized 
individuals 
-- -- -- 0.5% 
(1) 
0.1% 
(1) 
Wrongfully counted 
absentee ballots from 
other provinces 
-- -- -- 0.5% 
(1) 
0.1% 
(1) 
Total 100% 
(43) 
100% 
(325) 
100% 
(237) 
100% 
(200) 
100% 
(805) 
 
Source: La Gaceta (1901-1946). 
 
This finding clashes with the portrait of electoral fraud found in Fallas' Mamita Yunai, a novel 
about life in Limón in the heyday of United Fruit, or in the writings of Sancho, the intellectual 
who wrote several scathing portraits of life in pre-reform Costa Rica. Like many commentators 
of Latin American public life or purveyors of folk wisdom about elections there, these authors 
suggest that peasants and other voters were corralled into polling stations and forced to vote for 
the candidates favored by their patróns or gamonales. Yet, the arbitrariness of electoral officials, 
not that of private interests, angered parties supervising the election-day activities and the tally of 
the vote. 
17
  
 
Parties and citizens both took advantage of the secret franchise in the mid-1920s, which 
restricted voters' control over parties, to buy and sell votes. Charges of fraud were especially 
commonplace during the late 1920s and much of the 1930s. But not even these charges surpassed 
more than 14 percent, or 50 out of 364, of the accusations between 1925 and 1938. It was simply 
too expensive to buy large numbers of votes and too difficult for parties to ensure that voters 
behave as expected. The problems associated with controlling voters under the secret franchise 
are evident in the outrage of a prosperous PR agriculturist about his loss of 2,000 colones in a bet 
that "his" canton would vote for Carlos Maria Jiménez, his party's candidate, rather than Cleto 
González of PUN, in the 1928 presidential election. He lambasted "his" voters as "sons of 
bitches, spoilers; with [his] beasts of burden, and the blue banner [of the PR], they voted for don 
Cleto." 
18
  
 
Table 4 suggests that a significant portion of accusations did not necessarily stem from efforts to 
distort the results of the ballot box, for example, in the case of efforts to disqualify victorious 
candidates and electors (until 1913) because they did not satisfy requirements of residency, 
nationality, or profession. Another important allegation concerned the distribution of liquor on 
election day. Though the sale of liquor was prohibited on election day, parties typically offered a 
celebratory drink to their supporters, especially in rural areas. Because we find no accusations 
that voters arrived drunk at the polls, the use of liquor appears to have been an essential 
component of the sociabilité of the lower orders after voting. 
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Grievances about the political partiality of public authorities also did not involve the accusation 
of fraud: for instance, one party's unfair use of the official telegraph or of official vehicles. 
Sometimes the charge was that parties were not policed with the same level of rigor. But there 
were also accusations of a more formal nature, including the absence of appropriate signatures 
and their flourishes (rúbricas). The range of the irregularities that parties denounced reveals the 
intensity with which they observed every stage of the electoral process. The thoroughness of 
their efforts also discloses their willingness to capitalize upon any infraction of electoral law for 
partisan advantage, no matter how minor the violation.  
 
Table 5 presents information about the types of accusations lodged against polling stations. One 
immediately evident trend is that formal violations of the law--largely the absence of relevant 
signatures--predominated between 1901 and 1923, but declined in subsequent years, representing 
only 11 percent of all accusations between 1940 and 1946. That charges of a more serious kind 
began to increase suggests that the electoral competition began to rely more on blatant acts of 
fraud.  
 
Another trend worth noting is that new types of accusations against polling stations arrived in the 
wake of the 1925-1927 reforms. Violations of the secrecy of the franchise, as well as the misuse 
of identification cards, paper ballots, and ballot boxes, now came under fire. A good example of 
this sort of fraud occurred in Cartago during the 1932 elections. According to Carlos Salazar 
Oreamuno, who requested that the votes obtained by the PRN in a polling station be annulled, 
"the election was held in the house of the local chief of the PRN, that is, on his farm called 'La 
Flora.' There was a place reserved for voters that contained a window for the purpose of coercing 
voters, from which don Alejandro González could check and encourage his workers to vote for 
Ricardo Jiménez." This period also witnessed a corresponding decrease in charges that voters 
had been unjustly excluded from electoral rolls; polling stations lost the ability to alter these lists 
after the creation of the Civic Registry in 1927. The 1927 electoral law transferred all 
responsibility of including or excluding names from electoral rolls to this central institution. 
20
  
 
Long-Term Trends in the Practice of Electoral Fraud  
To chart changes through time, we locate all accusations of fraud in one of two dimensions--the 
first being whether the act is, or is not, manifestly fraudulent, and the second measuring the 
intensity of the abuse exercised against voters. This procedure yields a comparative assessment 
of the 1,197 charges of fraud made between 1901 and 1946 according to their severity. This total 
does not include the forty-two accusations in which the nature of the fraudulent act remains 
unclear or which did not involve an accusation of fraud. When linked to their geographical 
locations, this classification generates the most complete portrait of electoral fraud possible.  
 
We also classify the accusations by four categories. Category 1 contains all formal charges, 
including the absence of signatures and the late swearing in of polling-station members. Such 
accusations are not conclusive proof of the perpetuation of electoral fraud. No better example of 
a formal denunciation of electoral procedure exists than that lodged during the 1921 campaign in 
Limón, "where [the polling station] remained unassembled for long periods and where, for half 
an hour, all of its members lunched in different places. [During their absence], they left the 
polling station in solitude." 
21
  
 
One curious feature of registering votes was the use of comillas (quotation marks). Before the 
franchise was made secret, comillas were often used by polling station officials to record any 
vote that was identical to the one cast immediately before it. Petitioners often claimed that this 
policy was illegal and could be used to inflate the number of votes obtained by their rivals. As in 
the lunch example, this type of violation could have been due to the carelessness or inexperience 
of polling-station officials; as such, it would not necessarily have favored one party over another. 
Nevertheless, defeated parties often exploited such shortcomings to impugn electoral results; 39 
percent of all the accusations against polling stations between 1901 and 1946 were of this nature.  
 
In the aftermath of the December 1923 presidential vote, for example, none of the three 
candidates obtained the absolute majority of votes needed to be declared the winner. In 
accordance with the constitution, the race was thrown into the legislature, where the new 
Congress--half the members of which had just stood for election--selected the president from the 
two candidates that obtained the largest number of votes in early May. Since congressmen were 
elected in each of seven multi-member districts through proportional representation (or through 
relative majorities if one or two seats were available in a province), the presidential outcome 
hinged upon the tally of the vote made by each provincial electoral council. 
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In 1923, the PR and Reformist Party (PRf) allied to form a majority on the provincial electoral 
council of Heredia to annul approximately 9 percent (or 589) of the provincial votes because of 
procedural violations. By doing so, the PR and the PRf also reduced the number of votes needed 
to obtain a deputy; in the absence of such a maneuver, the Agricultural Party (PA) would have 
obtained two deputies. Both the PR and the PRf also appear to have conspired to reorder the tally 
of the vote so that a PR candidate was selected as first alternate for Alajuela; this PR alternate 
became one of the members of the provincial delegation in Congress because of a deputy's 
resignation. By each obtaining an additional deputy, these too parties were able to muster the 
bare number of legislative votes to select Ricardo Jiménez, the Republican candidate, as 
president. 
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Category 2 includes charges that officials acted unfairly but not necessarily fraudulently--for 
example, by placing a polling station closer to the headquarters of one party or distributing liquor 
on election day. Another common charge was that officials started or ended a polling station's 
hours of operation unlawfully. One unique infraction that belongs in this category was that made 
against the commander of the Saint Lucas Prison in Puntarenas during the 1921 midterm 
elections. According to the plaintiff, the commander used the prison boat "for the exclusive 
benefit of the party led by Francisco Aguilar. As a result, everyone could see Commander 
Guevara travel up and down the coast, openly drawing attention to his cause by transporting 
people interested in his candidate." 
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Category 3 includes all those accusations that undeniably involved fraudulent practices, such as 
the false use of identification cards, the intimidation of voters, the removal of ballots from the 
ballot box, and the alteration of paper ballots in any way. A particularly noteworthy example is 
the accusation made by a prf provincial leader in Guanacaste after the 1930 midterm elections: 
"The rain [chorreo] of votes was scandalous; even the dead voted." 
25
  
 
Category 4 encompasses all of the charges that involve the use of force or violence. These 
charges were especially common during hotly contested races. Held during the controversial 
presidency of Alfredo González (1914-1917), whose term was cut short by a military coup, the 
1915 midterm elections were denounced by the opposition as fraudulent. A typical example 
occurred in the first district of the Canton of Moravia of San José, where members of the polling 
station claimed that  from 6 a.m., when the voting began to elect deputies for San José, we noted 
the strong pressure exercised by the police against citizens. They forced them to vote for the 
governing ticket and were responsible for distributing ballots to citizens. When, by 2:05 p.m., the 
opposition had more votes than the government, a citizen presented himself to vote for the 
opposition. His vote, however, was rejected because the police had orders to prevent voting 
against the government. 
26
  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Accusations of Fraud, by Category (1-4), Region, and Time Period, 1901-1946. 
SOURCE: La Gaceta (1901-1946).  
 
An overview of this information is presented in Figure 3, which confirms and clarifies the 
tendency noted in our qualitative assessment of electoral fraud. Of the total number of 
accusations from categories 3 and 4 between 1901 and 1912, 42 percent occurred in the country's 
center. This figure, however, may be an overestimate; the low number of formal accusations that 
exist for the center during this period undermines its representativeness. During the subsequent 
period, the center's share fell to 19 percent, but it increased to 35 percent between 1925 and 
1938. The center was responsible for 73 percent of all accusations from categories 3 and 4 that 
took place between 1940 and 1946. [ 
  
Even by controlling for geographical location, blatant acts of fraud become more commonplace 
with time. Approximately one-fifth of all accusations lodged in the center between 1901 and 
1923 were category 3 and 4 accusations. This share increased to 55 percent between 1925 and 
1938 and 81 percent during the 1940s. The rhythm of fraud was similar in the periphery, where 
24 percent of all such accusations between 1901 and 1912 were of the two most severe types. 
This proportion increased to 62 percent in the following period. After 1925, category 3 and 4 
accusations account for approximately 72 percent of all accusations of fraud.  
 
This classification also reveals that the thrust of fraud changed with the approval of the secret 
ballot. Table 6 indicates that before the mid-1920s, parties strove both to increase their share of 
the vote as well as to reduce the numbers of votes obtained by their rivals. Many of the 
accusations refer to vote deflation or inflation. In the era of the public ballot, the tactics of 
disqualifying voters, excluding them from the registry, or refusing to accept their votes made 
sense because parties, in every polling station, knew how well or badly they were doing 
throughout election day. But after the establishment of the secret franchise, parties did not know 
how they were doing until the ballots were counted. Attempting to deflate the vote totals of one's 
rivals became less useful than inflating one's own, by canvassing voters or otherwise. Once 
citizens could safeguard the privacy of their votes, parties tried to locate voters who would sell 
out. They also sought citizens willing to sell their voter-identification cards. These documents 
came into being with the 1927 electoral law, but their effectiveness was impaired because the 
government did not mandate the use of photographs on them until the late 1940s.  
 
The Magnitude of Electoral Fraud  
Parties went to great lengths not only to manufacture fraud but also to document it. Indeed, the 
amount of information about ostensibly illegal and clandestine types of activity is staggering. 
Even if we accept the premise that petitioners--the vast majority of whom represented parties that 
lost elections--exaggerated claims of malfeasance, we still need to determine whether the fraud 
that the petitions allege to have occurred was extensive enough to overturn the results of the 
ballot box. Figure 4 indicates that the proportion of cantons--the jurisdictional units below that of 
provinces--where fraud supposedly occurred was greater than the share of districts and polling 
stations--spatial units at an even finer level of resolution--where it was perpetrated. Depending 
on the geographical sophistication of the petitioner, the extent of fraud could be magnified to 
attract political sympathy and to discredit adversaries. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of Cantons, Districts, and Polling Stations with Accusations of Electoral 
Fraud, 1901-1946. SOURCE: La Gaceta (1901-1946).  
 
A good example of the political manipulation of geographical boundaries is provided by the 
1905/1906 elections, which are infamous for the amount of fraud practiced against anti-
government forces. Opposition parties impugned the results of slightly more than half of all 
cantons in popular elections. Yet, disaggregating these results discovers that only slightly more 
than one-third of the districts in these cantons had reports of fraud, and only 10 percent of polling 
stations in these districts were suspected of being crooked. Even during the period when voters 
had the fewest safeguards, it was difficult for parties to manufacture large numbers of false 
votes, despite their best efforts. What made these elections scandalous was not the violation of 
voters' rights but the rampant mistreatment of electors. Once the popular election results showed 
that Cleto González, the official candidate, was short of the support of an absolute majority of 
the electors, President Ascención Esquivel either jailed or strong-armed 43 percent of them (371 
of 855) before they met in the 1906 electoral assemblies. 
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According to Table 7, fewer than fifty votes were at stake in approximately two-thirds of all the 
petitions that identify the number of questioned votes. Dividing the number of polling stations by 
the total number of votes between 1913 and 1946 reveals that the average polling station 
received slightly less than 100 votes. Most accusations of fraud impugned about half of the votes 
cast at the polling stations in question. If, to compensate for any underestimate of questioned 
votes, we assume that all of the votes cast in questioned polling stations were fraudulent and that 
the percentage of fraudulent votes is similar to the percentage of polling stations questioned, the 
conclusion is that only a handful of elections could have been affected by fraud.  
 
Table 7 
Number of Impugned Votes in the Accusations of Fraud, by Time Period, 1901-1946  
 Time Period  
 
 
Impugned Votes 1913-1923 1925-1938 1940-1946 Total 
 
1-9 15 17 1 33 
10-49 11 12 26 49 
50-99 10 3 10 23 
100+ 10 3 10 23 
Total 46 35 47 128 
 
Source: La Gaceta (1901-1946). 
 
Fraud could not have been responsible for most presidential victories because the difference 
between the votes for winners and losers was greater than 10 percent in eighteen out of twenty-
one elections held between 1901 and 1946. One of these elections was completely without 
accusations of fraud. Another one had accusations, but no polling stations were questioned. In 
three elections, the percentage of polling stations that came under fire was less than 1 percent of 
the total; in eight, it hovered between 1 and 3.9 percent; in two, it oscillated between 4 and 4.9 
percent of all polling stations; in three, it was between 7 and 9.9 percent. Only three elections 
saw the share of fraudulent votes reach 10 percent or higher, but only two elections (1905 and 
1923) showed a difference in votes that was less than 10 percent. Hence, with only two 
exceptions, not even our liberal estimate of the magnitude of electoral fraud is sufficient to 
change the overall result of presidential elections. Moreover, it is important to note that in the 
1,197 accusations, 44 percent, or 524, belong in category 1 or 2. A good portion of the polling 
stations were cited for irregularities not necessarily the product of fraudulent design, especially 
between 1901 and 1923, when most accusations were from category 1 or 2. Figure 5 shows 
election year variations in such activity. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Accusations of Electoral Fraud Ranked by Categories (1-4) and Magnitude, 1901-
1946. SOURCE: La Gaceta (1901-1946).  
 
For all of the ink spilled describing ballot rigging, fraud was not the determining factor of most 
elections in pre-reform Costa Rica. The discourse of fraud was always larger than its reality. 
Even with generous assumptions, its impact was slight, varying by time and place. It reached its 
peak before 1913, when indirect elections allowed presidents the opportunity to identify and jail 
a relatively small number of electors. After the establishment of direct elections, however, it 
became virtually impossible to steal a presidential election. As a rule, it was easiest to 
manipulate the results of a midterm election in the periphery where the turnout was lowest. 
Winning a few extra deputies here and there, as the 1923 legislative election most clearly 
demonstrates, could help parties to amass the majorities necessary to pass laws, and, until 1926, 
when a popular runoff between the two runners-up replaced a Congressional runoff, it could 
determine who gained control of the presidency. But, in general, the extent of electoral fraud was 
limited.  
 
Why all of the fuss about it? For one thing, even as it became more difficult to shape election 
outcomes, well-organized parties could try, and perhaps even succeed, to win a few extra votes 
here and there, particularly in local politics, where fraud could be deployed to alter municipal 
and legislative results. The possibility of gaining advantage through underhanded maneuvers was 
enough to unsettle most parties and to augment uncertainty in what were typically competitive 
elections. That parties could blame their defeat at the polls on the fraudulent activities of their 
rivals furnishes the second reason why denunciations of fraud persisted despite the fact that 
electoral legislation became fairer. It was a rational strategy to claim that fraud had decisively 
shaped electoral outcomes, regardless of what parties knew or believed.  
 
The magnitude of fraud was not uniform throughout the national territory. Of the 1,239 
accusations of fraud presented between 1901 and 1946, 51 percent, or 627, of the total 
denounced irregularities were committed in the periphery. In fact, between 1901 and 1938, the 
largest portion of accusations was concentrated in outlying Guanacaste, Limón, and Puntarenas. 
Furthermore, when comparing the percentage of questioned polling stations with voter turnout 
rates, trends in the center and the periphery are different, though not remarkably so. In the center, 
fraud was more prevalent in midterm elections, when turnout typically reached its lowest point; 
between 1913 and 1946, turnout in such elections averaged 52 percent. In contrast, during 
general elections, turnout reached an average high of 80 percent. In the periphery, even though 
midterm elections saw the highest rates of accusations lodged against polling stations, serious 
accusations increased during the general elections that took place between 1925 and 1938, when 
the average turnout rate was 55 percent--a drop of 8 percentage points from the average midterm 
election-turnout rate. These trends are displayed by figures 6 and 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Voter-Turnout Rates and the Percentage of Polling Stations Alleged to Be Fraudulent 
in the Center, 1901-1946. SOURCE: La Gaceta (1901-1946).  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Voter-Turnout Rates and the Percentage of Polling Stations Alleged to Be Fraudulent 
in the Periphery, 1901-1946. SOURCE: La Gaceta (1901-1946).  
 
As the data in Table 8 show, the percentage of questioned polling stations was usually smaller in 
the center than in the periphery, and the percentage of category 3 or 4 accusations was always 
greater in the periphery than in the center between 1901 and 1938. Nevertheless, the two most 
severe types of fraud occurred less frequently in midterm than in general elections. The 
percentage of polling stations questioned might have been greater in midterm than in general 
elections for the entire country, but the most fraudulent electoral practices occurred when 
presidential and legislative elections were held simultaneously in the periphery. 
 
Table 8 
Voter Turnout Rates (T), Impugned Polling Stations (IPS) and the Severest Categories of 
Fraud (C3-4), by Provinces and Time Periods, 1901-1946  
Provinces General Elections  
 
 
 1901-1912
a
  
 
1913-1923  
 
1925-1938  
 
1940-1946  
 
 
 T IPS c3-4 T IPS C3-4 T IPS C3-4 T IPS C3-4  
   
SJ, A, C & 
H 
61.7 3.3 19.0 71.1 2.3 22.6 76.9 2.3 71.4 93.0 1.3 88  
G, P & L 56.9 11.7 22.6 71.4 13.9 65.9 54.6 9.2 80.2 71.3 2 76.9  
Provinces Midterm Elections  
 
 
 1901-1912
a
  
 
1913-1923  
 
1925-1938  
 
1940-1946  
 
 
 T IPS c3-4 T IPS C3-4 T IPS C3-4 T IPS C3-4  
   
SJ, A, C & 
H 
   37.1 9.3 19.8 44.9 2.2 26.2 74.2 4.7 80  
G, P & L    52.6 22.2 56.5 36.7 5.9 67.3 59.3 7.1 71.4  
  
a
 Indirect elections. During midterm elections electors chosen during the most 
recent general elections selected deputies in provincial electoral assemblies. 
 
Note: SJ = San José; A= Alajuela; C = Cartago; H = Heredia; G = Guanacaste; P 
= Puntarenas; L = Limón. 
 
Source: La Gaceta (1901-1946).  
 
These divergences stem from the distinct strategic environments presented by the center and the 
periphery. As we have seen, higher rates of urbanization and of literacy in the core areas of the 
country encouraged parties to mobilize voters, monitor polling-station behavior, and stuff the 
ballot box. Until the 1940s, mobilizing voters and policing the behavior of rivals kept down 
levels of electoral fraud in the center, especially since this area had the largest share of public 
offices. Only in midterm elections, when interest in elections declined, did the relative weight of 
fraudulent activity increase in the center. In the periphery, however, general elections were the 
more fraudulent because they were the most pivotal. Parties perpetrated acts of fraud there 
because the citizens, who were more economically disadvantaged and geographically isolated, 
enjoyed fewer of the safeguards that existed in the core areas of the country.  
 
Far from being a randomly occurring event, electoral fraud followed a logic that was 
geographically and institutionally based Because it had a recognizable set of dynamics, it can be 
studied systematically: Accusations can be classified and counted; numbers of impugned votes 
can be totalled and spatially located; and rival hypotheses about its development and significance 
can be evaluated. This article demonstrates that students of pre-reform political systems can, and 
probably should, identify archival and newspaper sources containing allegations of electoral 
fraud. The study of electoral fraud is crucial to an understanding of how regimes stay in power, 
how opposition movements combat them, and how citizens and politicians interact to select their 
governments.  
 
What is also clear from our analysis is that institutional reform changed political behavior. The 
often elaborately complex deals struck by presidents and legislators to reform electoral laws 
were not merely rhetorical performances for newspapers and commentators in the capital. They 
involved an enormous amount of calculation, persuasion, and expenditure of resources, and they 
profoundly shaped the strategies that parties employed to attract  the support of an increasingly 
literate male electorate. In highly competitive races, parties faced powerful incentives to 
manufacture fraud and, interestingly enough, equally compelling ones to exploit every 
opportunity to denounce it, as is evident from the petitions to nullify electoral results and related 
legal material. 
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Yet, the rules governing access to state power were not the only set of constraints shaping the 
practice of electoral fraud. The multiplicity of ways in which social structure and cultural and 
political practices interacted to affect human behavior in particular geographical regions had a 
pronounced impact on the nature and frequency of electoral fraud. The most blatant and coercive 
types of fraud occurred in the periphery, where large-scale plantation agriculture and cattle 
ranching was concentrated, even though this area contained only about one-fifth of the 
electorate. Individuals there were unable to muster the resources to ensure that parties followed 
the letter of the electoral law. The center of country, however--with its urban areas and important 
strata of small- and medium-sized coffee producers--was able to sustain a civil society more 
capable of policing electoral behavior.  
 
Far from being merely the reflection of socially based disputes, however, the attempt to stuff the 
ballot box was shaped by the nature and logic of the struggle for state power. Indeed, fraud 
increased, both in general and in the center, during the 1940s when incumbent presidents used 
the powers of their office to retain their party's grip on the state. Whether such efforts, as the 
opposition claimed, were responsible for the PRN's continued domination throughout much of 
the 1940s is far from clear; Picado's victory in 1944 may have been helped, but not necessarily 
been caused, by officially sponsored acts of fraud. In the context of an effective system of private 
voting rights, those who were disposed to manufacture fraud in the center clearly could not avoid 
being detected. The heavy-handed use of state power for partisan advantage enraged the 
opposition and created a sector dedicated to overthrowing the government through the use of 
force. The very struggle for retaining control of the presidency fuelled the development of a 
political crisis that served to shift the locus of fraud from the periphery to the center. Arguments 
about the sources of ballot rigging must pay attention to their social settings as well as to their 
institutional underpinnings. 
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Factoring in the importance of institutional arrangements is the only way to make sense of the 
long-term increase in the accusations of electoral fraud. Paradoxically, parties started spending 
more time denouncing acts of fraud just when electoral legislation was making such acts more 
difficult to commit. It would have taken fraud of category 3 or 4 severity to change the results of 
the ballot box, but this was precisely the type that became easier for parties to document and 
denounce. Once these kinds of acts became commonplace in the Central Valley, where the vast 
majority of voters lived in closely linked communities, they became widely perceived as 
scandalous.  
 
Discussing the "reality" of fraudulent political practice is a tricky business because perpetrators 
were hardly eager to leave traces of it for posterity. What makes the petitions to nullify electoral 
results so valuable is that, like most crime statistics, they are not based on the disclosures made 
by the actual perpetrators of fraudulent acts. Hence, we do not have to worry about 
underreporting. Shame, however, hardly prevented the parties from denouncing each others' 
behavior. Precisely because petitions were written by those who stood to gain if fraud were to be 
detected, they may well have overestimated its extent. Indeed, highly competitive races provided 
incentive for parties to exaggerate the deviousness of their adversaries. 
  
Yet, several factors constrained the behavior of petitioners. Unlike newspaper columnists, 
petitioners had to document their charges. Electoral law required them to identify and describe 
infractions, as well as submit proof of their occurrence. Furthermore, not every party had the 
capacity to coordinate teams of election observers and lawyers to prepare the petitions within the 
time permitted by law. Perhaps the single most telling indication of the petitions' validity is that 
even a generous evaluation of them indicates that fraud was not responsible for determining the 
outcome of the vast majority of presidential elections.  
 
Partisan interests are also expressed by what the petitions do not say. It is highly revealing that 
none of the legal petitions before 1913, when direct elections were established, ever concerned 
how ordinary males voted for electors. Instead, they focus on the manipulation of second-stage 
electors, who had to meet literacy tests and stiff property requirements, by an incumbent 
president. Though newspapers contained scattered reports of abuses during popular elections 
before 1913, legal complaints concentrate on irregularities at the second stage because in those 
days, elections were controlled by coercing hundreds of electors, not thousands of voters.  
 
It is equally significant that the petitions never express any reservations about the absence of 
safeguards for voters before the effective establishment of the secret franchise in 1927. What 
both lacunae reveal is that parties were more worried about falling behind their competitors than 
about instituting safeguards for voters. Indeed, the absence of any complaints about the ability of 
parties to monitor "their" share of the electorate reflects both the interests of parties and the 
undoubtedly widely held belief that parties should know how "their" voters were behaving at the 
polls. Finally, it is important to note that the petitions devote little space to the illegal traffic in 
identification cards before the establishment of the photographic cards in 1946.  
 
For all of the time and effort that parties took to decry it, the effectiveness of fraud was more 
apparent than real. Although fraud could dramatically alter the outcome of races at the local 
level, at the aggregate level, it had much less an influence on the results of presidential elections 
or the overall balance of power in Congress. After the elimination of two-stage elections, fraud 
was clearly decisive in only the 1923 presidential race. This curious finding suggests that parties 
found themselves increasingly caught in a collective-action problem. The unilateral use of fraud 
may have held the promise of helping a party to win an election, but its use by all created a 
stalemate or even a disadvantage for particular parties; fraud could conceivably have snatched 
defeat from what might have been victory in a fair election. Moreover, even for victors, the 
widespread use of fraud, or the mere suspicion of it, might rob them of legitimacy and threaten to 
destabilize their regimes.  
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